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“RUBBER WILL NOT KEEP IN THIS COUNTRY”: FAILED DEVELOPMENT IN BENIN, 1897-1921 
 
JAMES FENSKE1 
 
ABSTRACT. Although Nigeria's Benin region was a major rubber producer in 1960, the industry 
faltered before 1921. I use labour scarcity and state capacity to explain why rubber did not 
take hold in this period. The government was unable to protect Benin's rubber forests from 
over-exploitation. Plantations found it difficult to recruit workers, and the government was 
unwilling to allow expatriates to acquire land. Colonial officials promoted the development of 
“communal” plantations, but these suffered due to labour scarcity and a state that was short 
on staff and equipment, and dependent on local chiefs. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
African history is littered with development projects that failed spectacularly 
(Bromund, 1997; Ferguson, 1990; Mackenzie, 1998). The colonial government in 
Nigeria’s Benin region spent the first two decades of the twentieth century 
unsuccessfully promoting rubber production. In 1921, motivated by low producer 
prices and Britain’s global policy of reducing rubber acreage, the Director of Agriculture 
wrote that his department would cease distributing seeds, since it was “not desirable 
that we should appear to in any way be advocating the planting of this product” 
(Anschel, 1965, p. 51).  Though this appears at first to be simply one more botched 
attempt at development, it is a puzzle when set against Benin’s later history. By 1961, 
Nigeria was Africa’s largest producer of natural rubber, and the bulk of this was 
produced around Benin. This slow start contrasts not only with Benin’s later history, 
but also with the rapid spread of other cash crops during the same period, such as cocoa 
in south-western Nigeria and Ghana (Austin, 2005; Berry, 1975). This example, then, 
can help explain the failures of development projects and technological diffusion in 
areas where the project or technology is suited to the physical environment.  
Why did rubber development fail in Benin before 1921? Neither prices nor 
government disinterest can explain this episode. Nominal rubber prices were 17% 
higher during the post-war rubber boom (1946-1960) than from 1900 to 1921, but 
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annual physical output was more than 35 times greater.2 Further, production rose 
steadily from 1932 to 1939, when prices were lower than in either of these periods. 
Before 1921, the government actively encouraged production of both wild and planted 
rubber. 
I argue that the labour scarcity and state capacity are what constrained rubber 
during this period. These constraints affected each of the three principal sectors of the 
industry differently. Wild rubber failed because the colonial state lacked the ability to 
adequately monitor tapping and because it undermined existing systems of property 
rights, converting a formerly common property resource into open access. These 
problems were made worse by the region's scarcity of labour. Private plantations of 
local Funtumia rubber and Brazilian Para rubber struggled to find labour.3 Expatriates 
also confronted a colonial state that believed acquisition of land by foreigners would 
undermine its strategy of indirect rule. “Communal” plantations too coped with the 
unavailability of labour. Further, the colonial state was dependent on local chiefs who 
appropriated the benefits of these plantations. Short on staff and equipment, the state 
was unable to effectively maintain its investment or pass skills to locals. 
In this paper, I use archival evidence to support this explanation. The scarcity of 
quantitative data for this period makes it impossible to use credible counterfactuals to 
sort out the difficulties in Benin’s rubber industry that had the greatest impact. I am 
able, however, to show that the key problems identified in the archival record were also 
present in other cases of failed rubber development. Wild rubber elsewhere in Africa 
and plantations in both Africa and Brazil faced many of the same problems as Benin. 
Further, these constraints were largely absent from Brazilian wild rubber or from 
plantations in southeast Asia, and had been substantially relaxed when Benin became a 
successful exporter of rubber after the Second World War. 
I add to our knowledge of several issues. First, the slow adoption of new technologies 
in developing countries remains a barrier to growth. Existing studies have emphasized 
factors such as costly learning (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010), 
heterogeneous returns (Suri, 2010; Zeitlin, 2011), and fixed costs combined with 
present-bias (Duflo et al., 2011). I add to this literature by including explanatory 
variables that vary over time and space in their ability to delay technological change. 
While labour scarcity in particular is understood as an important determinant of 
technological change by economic historians (e.g. Allen, 2009), it has not featured 
largely in the more recent literature in development. 
I also contribute to our understanding of state capacity and labour scarcity as 
determinants of development. African history provides many examples of initiatives 
that failed due the prejudices, ignorance, and weakness of colonial and post-colonial 
states. Similarly, African states have often adopted policies that hinder development in 
order to ensure their own political survival (Bates, 1981; Van der Walle, 2001). The 
                                                          
2 Anschel (1965) gives price figures that average £153 per ton from 1900 to 1921, £179 per ton from 
1945 to 1960, and £37 per ton from 1932 to 1939. Exports are 25,884 tons versus 701, on average. 
3 By “plantation,” simply mean a purposefully planted farm of rubber trees. This follows the convention of 
the primary sources, and does not require that the farm be large in scale or worked with hired labor.  
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colonial state in Benin lacked the knowledge and resources to directly implement and 
enforce its policies. Reliance on local chiefs and staff whose incentives did not match 
those of the state limited the effectiveness of its development initiatives. An old 
literature in African history suggests that scarce labour has been an important factor in 
the continent’s development (Austin, 2008; Fenske, 2012a; Hopkins, 1973). Similarly, 
economists understand that population is crucial for development, over the long run 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002) and over the very long run (Galor and Weil, 2000). I show that 
labour scarcity hindered both labour-intensive production and the management of a 
common property resource in Benin.  
In the next section, I provide background on rubber and on Benin. I describe my 
sources and how I use these to explain the failure of rubber in Benin before 1921. In the 
subsequent sections, I discuss wild rubber, privately-owned plantations, and the 
government-supported communal plantations in turn. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND SOURCES 
 
The vulcanization of rubber in 1843 made it useful for hoses, tubing, springs, 
washers, diaphragms, and other industrial applications, spurring demand that was 
accelerated by the later spread of bicycles and automobiles (Harms, 1975). Before Asian 
supply lowered world prices, Africans exported wild rubber to meet this demand. The 
largest African exporters during this period were Angola, the Congo Free State, the 
French Congo, French Guinea, and the Gold Coast.  
I focus on rubber production in the area surrounding the Edo-speaking Kingdom of 
Benin, centred on the Benin District of colonial Nigeria. This mid-western region also 
contains the Ijaw, Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo areas of the western Niger Delta. The Benin 
Kingdom had traded slaves, stone beads, pepper, ivory, and cotton cloth with 
Europeans, before choosing relative isolation during the palm oil trade of the nineteenth 
century (Ryder, 1969). Pre-colonial Edo agriculture centred on yams, supplemented 
with maize, plantain, cocoyam, cassava, beans, melon, okro and other vegetables 
(Egharevba, 1949, p. 68). 
British colonialism in Nigeria began with the annexation of Lagos in 1861. Britain’s 
formal influence was confined to the coast until the 1890s. The Niger Coast Protectorate 
was established in 1891. It was merged in 1900 with territories under the control of the 
Royal Niger Company to form the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Benin was brought 
under British rule in 1897 as part of this process of conquest. The Oba (king) was exiled, 
and indirect rule was carried out through a Native Council of chiefs. Benin was part of 
the Central Province of Southern Nigeria until 1914 (see Figure 1). That year, a new Oba 
was installed and the Benin Province became part of a unified Nigeria. 
Economic policy in Southern Nigeria before 1910 focused on “developing the 
estates.” The first High Commissioner, Ralph Moor, believed that economic development 
would be achieved by promoting law and order, removing obstacles to trade, 
encouraging products that complemented English industry, and giving European 
traders free access to the interior (Afigbo, 1970). The most significant efforts in this 
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development project were directed towards transport and communication 
infrastructure, currency, and maintaining order (Helleiner, 1966, p. 34). Promotion of 
specific crops by the Departments of Forestry and Agriculture was a smaller part of this 
programme. In 1910, the government of Southern Nigeria spent only £13,226 on 
Forestry and £14,638 on Agriculture, versus £104,863 on the West African Frontier 
Force, £118,656 on the Marine Department, and £154,697 on the railway.4 
Still, British efforts at forest conservation, experimentation with new crops, and 
improvement of existing crops were key components of Moor’s economic development 
policies (Afigbo, 1970, p.386) Britain did attempt to encourage other products in Benin, 
though rubber was given particular attention.  While more than 2,200 communal rubber 
plantations had been established in the Central Province by 1908, cocoa was introduced 
in roughly 1909 and communal plantations were not established until 1915 (Igbafe, 
1979, p. 362). Government efforts at promoting cotton were limited to distributing 
seed, supporting chiefs in creating plantations, offering prizes for quality, and 
establishing an experimental plantation in another part of Nigeria (Igbafe, 1979, p. 364-
5; Afigbo, 1970, p. 395). Neither cotton nor cocoa ever experienced the same later 
success as rubber in Benin.5 The only other product that received comparable support 
during in these years was timber (Igbafe, 1979, p. 348-557). Elsewhere in Nigeria, cash 
crops were adopted with little government encouragement. Berry (1975, p.33), for 
example, shows that government policies and programs mattered little in Yoruba 
adoption of cocoa. Rubber, then, received more state encouragement than other crops, 
but was unsuccessful before 1921.  
My principal sources are colonial annual reports, records of the West African Lands 
Committee (WALC), and correspondence from the National Archives of the United 
Kingdom (NAUK) in Kew and the National Archives of Nigeria in Ibadan (NAI). I am 
constrained by these to use a mostly qualitative analysis. Excepting total exports, there 
are no systematic data available.6 Other sources of quantitative information are 
scattered and inconsistent, ruling out counterfactual analysis.7 Instead, I examine the 
                                                          
4 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1910, p. 5 
5 See, for example, NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division; NAI BP 209/1914 Forestry 
Report 1913 
6 For example, the World Rubber Statistics Historic Handbook is the main source used by Frank and 
Musacchio (2006). For Nigeria, it reports exports with only a single significant digit, which is less precise 
than the annual series in Anschel (1965). It does not report the amount of land planted to rubber for 
Nigeria over time; neither does Anschel (1965). 
7 For example, the annual reports do not give the same information about rubber every year. The 1909 
annual report (p. 14) states the amount of revenue collected in rubber licenses. The 1908 report does not. 
The 1908 report states the amount of rubber produced specifically in the Central Province, but notes that 
this cannot be separated from the rubber produced in Northern Nigeria and shipped through the Central 
Province. The 1908 annual report states that there are 2,251 Funtumia plantations with 1,125,972 trees 
in the Central Province (p. 15), while no similar figure is stated in the 1907 or 1909 reports. As an 
example of the variability in the quantitative estimates in the records, take as an example the expected 
yield of rubber from a Funtumia tree. The report on the communal plantations for 1913 (NAI, Ben Prof 
2/1 BP 364 1914) gives estimates of the yields achieved per tree in the Benin City district between 1910 
and 1913 of 1 oz to 1.59 oz per tree; any counterfactual revenue calculation will change by 60% based on 
whether the high or low estimate is used. In the same period, other plantations in Cameroon and Ilesha 
had reported yields of 2.5 oz and 13 oz per tree (NAUK, CO 852 515 7: Commodities Rubber Nigeria. West 
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problems that faced the industry that are identified by colonial staff, officials, 
expatriates, and Africans in archival correspondence. This presents two challenges: bias 
and selectivity. Because officials highlight problems not of their own making, I ensure 
that the “unofficial” voices of Africans and expatriates are represented. To select the 
factors that were most important, I use a comparative approach. I identify features that 
Benin has in common with other areas in which rubber failed, and features that 
distinguish it from areas where rubber was more successful. First, I contrast Benin with 
other parts of Africa. Countries that experienced destruction of wild rubber and failure 
of expatriate plantations faced similar difficulties. Second, I contrast Benin with Asia. 
Many of the problems I identify were overcome in Malaya and Sumatra. Third, I 
compare Benin to Brazil. Brazil achieved greater success with wild rubber than Benin, 
but suffered from a similar inability to develop rubber plantations. Fourth, Benin’s later 
success is partly explained by the removal of the restrictions I identify. 
 
3. WILD RUBBER 
 
In this section, I outline the trade in wild (mostly Funtumia) rubber that followed 
Britain’s conquest of Benin. Soon after British conquest, non-Edo moved in and began 
tapping the region’s trees to exhaustion. Britain made efforts to restrict tapping early 
on, and I use records of the prosecutions of illicit tappers to expose the difficulties in 
enforcing these regulations. Though amended regulations appeared initially to have 
stopped the problem, these eventually failed. I argue that the new government could not 
police over-exploitation. First, the colonial state lacked the capacity to adequately 
monitor tapping. Second, it undermined existing systems of property rights, and was 
incapable of replacing them. Other regions of Africa struggled with over-tapping of wild 
rubber during the same period, for similar reasons. In Brazil, by contrast, property 
rights over wild rubber were well-defined, limiting these difficulties. These problems 
were compounded by Benin’s labour scarcity. 
Other writers have used case studies of wild rubber in Ashanti, the Congo, upper 
Guinée, and other parts of Nigeria as windows into issues in African development. These 
include the origins of institutional arrangements, sources of capital accumulation, 
integration of labour markets with export activities, entrepreneurship, broadening of 
the export base, imposition of colonial rule, and failures of colonial states (Arhin, 1980; 
Dumett, 1971; Harms, 1975; Omosini, 1979; Osborn, 2004). While other writers have 
described the regulations governing wild rubber in Benin (Afigbo, 1970; Igbafe, 1970, 
1979; Ofonagoro, 1979; Usuanlele, 2003) there has been no discussion of the reasons 
why these were unsuccessful. I provide new archival material that explains these 
failings. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
African Rubber Mission Report on Nigeria and British Cameroons, Appendix 2). Christy (1911, p. 193) 
reported that, in years 6 through 10, a Funtumia tree would give 4, 5, 9, 12 and 15 oz of dry rubber per 
year. Bell (1907) suggested that 16 oz per tree per year was normal for Funtumia in Uganda. There is 
evidence, then, to support ex ante expected yields per tree ranging from 1oz to 16oz per year. Similar 
levels of uncertainty exist for labour inputs and costs, and there is almost no information available on 
capital requirements or processing and transport costs. 
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Benin presents both similarities and differences. Because wild rubber was largely in 
the hands of non-Edo and no major peasant cash-crop industry existed before the 
1930s, rubber was not a source of capital and institutional innovation. Benin’s 
experience with wild rubber was not “successful African entrepreneurship.” The 
episode did, however, attract migrants who remained segmented from the local labour 
force. As in the Congo, rubber was integral to the opening of Benin to trade after 1897. 
Benin’s integration into a larger protectorate, however, meant that rubber’s 
contribution to the early colonial revenue was more modest. While Southern Nigeria 
exported £137,289 worth of rubber in 1900, total exports were £1,133,604.8 As in other 
accounts, I draw attention to what the state was unable to achieve.  
 
Overexploitation 
 
After the conquest of Benin in 1897, the chiefs Ologbosheri and Abohun launched a 
guerrilla campaign against the new rulers. Amidst this confusion, the government 
struggled to police rubber exploitation by Yoruba and Fante tapping gangs and by the 
Royal Niger Company (RNC). The British believed these outsiders were aiding 
Ologbosheri and Abohun. Fosbery, the Resident, reported that “undoubtedly all the 
rubber cutters in that part of the country were in his favour, and on the day of the first 
engagement our men were cursed from the bush by Yorubas.”9 Later on, he met a man 
living at Isua whose residence, “was undoubtedly the head centre of all the Yoruba 
rubber cutters in that part of the district; both these men were arrested, with several of 
their followers.”10 RNC agents moved into subject towns, encouraging them to ignore 
British officers. Moor reported that, during the expedition against Ologbosheri, arms 
and ammunition had “found their way into the disaffected area from the territories of 
the RNC, and were no doubt exchanged for the rubber.”11 He believed there was “a 
general league between the rebels, the local inhabitants, and the Yorubas who were in 
the territories as traders in rubber.”12 While some of this had found its way into Benin 
City, the majority he believed had been pushed into RNC territory, and RNC markings 
had been found on the guerrillas’ kegs of powder. Rubber passed into RNC territory 
after this; the defendants in an 1898 suit13 claimed to be employed by a man living in 
RNC territory who had sent them to Ipoki to work rubber. 
Intensive tapping by these outsiders raised yields but damaged the trees. Christy 
(1911, p. 126-129) describes methods used throughout West Africa.  Early tappers 
felled young trees. Later, they made deep cuts through the cambium, producing injuries 
that could take years to heal. Local knives would create jagged cuts that crushed the 
                                                          
8 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1900, p. 12-13. 
9 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: Enc 4: Report on Expedition against Ologbosheri 
and Abohun by Fosbery. 
10 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: Enc 4: Report on Expedition against Ologbosheri 
and Abohun by Fosbery. 
11 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: #1: May 27, 1899: Moor to Chamberlain. 
12 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: #1: May 27, 1899: Moor to Chamberlain. 
13 NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899. Regina v. Akonweli, Odutala, and Ola. 
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ends of the latex tubes, reducing the flow of latex. Cuts were made diagonally around 
the trunk, ringing the tree and stopping the conduction of sap. Often repeated every 6 
inches up to a height of 60 feet, this could kill the tree. Though I am not aware of any 
direct evidence from Benin, the methods Egboh (1985, p. 162-163) describes around 
Lagos would have been similar. There, Fante tappers adopted a variant of the herring-
bone system, abusing it by cutting through the cambium and tapping the entire surface 
within their reach, ring-barking the trees. 
The situation resembled open access, and the predictable result was 
overexploitation. In 1901, the Resident recalled that it was “deplorable to see what 
destruction was wrought by the foreign element some years ago around Ibewhe. Dead 
rubber trees can be counted by the hundred.”14 Fosbery expressed concern that the 
Yorubas had killed many of the local Funtumia, but also described his hope that the 
regulations would improve matters: 
 
The bush passed through between Iho and Isure, Isua and Ihuekpe has been a 
very rich rubber country, but I regret to say is now full of dead rubber trees. 
... The natives stated they never worked rubber, that it was done entirely by 
the Yorubas. I expounded the rubber regulations on every available 
opportunity, and urged the people to protect the riches of their country. ... 
This rubber has of course been a great source of revenue to Ologbosheri.15 
 
First  regulations 
 
British efforts to restrict tapping began with “makeshift” regulations, imposed in 
1897 “to stop foreigners entering the Benin country for the purpose of working the 
economic products therein.”16 Non-Edo were required to obtain licenses from the 
Resident every 6 months for 10s. The regulations prohibited all persons from “tapping 
rubber trees in such a manner as to permanently damage them or to interfere with their 
future yield.” The “chiefs of the districts” were made responsible for supervising 
adherence, and were to be awarded half penalties after convictions (Afigbo, 1970). 
Though the Colonial Office was unsure whether these regulations were legal, Fosbery 
promoted them during his operations against Ologbosheri. 
Prosecutions under these regulations tell us about the tappers who moved into Benin 
and the difficulty of enforcement.17 First, enforcement required policing by colonial staff 
such as forest guards. Second, these officials required cooperation from local 
communities. Third, tappers operated in gangs; if a few violators were caught, many 
would escape. Finally, the court was eager to use harsh sanctions against illicit tappers. 
                                                          
14 NAUK, CO 520/7, 26/2/1901: Resident Benin City to Moor. 
15 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: Enc 4: Report on Expedition against Ologbosheri 
and Abohun by Fosbery. 
16 NAUK, CO 444/1, 5 March, 1899: Moor to Under-Secretary of State. Concerns about the legality of these 
regulations are cited in the margin notes in this file. 
17 All of the cases cited here are from NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899. 
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Monitoring required manpower. The defendant in Regina v. Olowo had been trained 
by the Government rubber inspector. He and four others sent out six months earlier had 
not been seen since. He was arrested with three others in Owedou, but three of his 
accomplices escaped. He and his brother worked together, the defendant selling his 
product “for a piece of cloth,” and his brother for 7/6. He was sentenced to one month of 
hard labour. Quality similarly needed policing. Regulations passed over the objections of 
European traders in 1897 allowed confiscation of adulterated rubber (Igbafe, 1979). In 
Regina v. Osufu Jebu, Sumola, and Bakari, the prosecution witness (a Captain) stated 
that he found Osufu at Udo, carrying adulterated rubber towards Lagos. The prisoners 
claimed they had bought it in Benin City and did not know it was adulterated. They were 
imprisoned with hard labour for six months. 
Community cooperation was necessary. The same Captain told the court in Regina v.  
Jegidi and Agbi that, while in the same area, the residents of Obahon informed him that 
the defendants were cutting rubber. They claimed to be from Umapa, but “the natives of 
that village,” told him that they had never seen the men before. The Captain was also the 
prosecution witness in Regina v. Ground Nut, Jack, and Josiah. The defendants in that 
case had been arrested by the headman of Rejain with “a lot of tools etc. used for 
working rubber.” The Captain told the court that he had previously instructed the 
headman to arrest all those cutting rubber without a license. Their sentence was two 
years imprisonment with hard labour. In addition, the court noted that Ground Nut was 
a Mendi (likely Mende, from Sierra Leone) who had deserted government service. 
Monitoring was made more difficult by the size of tapping gangs. The defendant in 
Regina v. Thomas Ouami was charged as the headman of a gang of illicit rubber 
workers. The prosecution witness, T.A. Moses, a rubber inspector, stated that he found 
the prisoner working rubber with a large gang of men under him. On recognizing Moses, 
Ouami ordered his men to escape, begged Moses not to report him, and offered a bribe. 
The Acting Resident sentenced him to 9 months of hard labour. 
In Regina v. Ipapa, Ehenua, Obasuye, Asaota, and Jegede, the defendants were 
described as “a portion of a gang of 150 who were surprised by the Yorubas of the town 
working rubber near Okiewo.” They were found with rubber just collected in a calabash 
and rubber gouges, and were sentenced to 1 year hard labour each. The defendant in 
Regina v. Jagbohun was charged with not leaving Benin after being found guilty of 
“complicity with illicit rubber workers.” Ten days later, he was brought down from Isua, 
pleading that he was trying to catch illicit rubber workers. The incredulous Acting 
Resident sentenced him to six months hard labour. 
Punishments were harsh. In Regina v. Gbeson and Aburonke, Regina v. Adeanju, and 
Regina v. Lawojo and Omoleye, the defendants were each sentenced to six months or 
one year each for “illicit rubber working” or “working rubber without a license.” By 
contrast, a man who stole a goat from the market to pay a debt of 8s was sentenced to 
14 days hard labour, a man who three times abducted the same female slave of a chief 
was fined £1 and given three dozen lashes, and a man convicted of “resisting the 
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government” was given one year of hard labour.18 Notably, there is only one rubber case 
in this book in which the defendant is acquitted.19 
The regulations were soon found inadequate (Afigbo, 1970). In October 1898, 
Gallwey reported that Benin was “full of rubber,” but that the Acting Resident had 
“continually been complaining” of the destruction of rubber trees due to “the manner in 
which the natives tapped them.” The number of trees killed amounted to “no small 
figure.”20 In February 1899, Moor stated that it was “utterly impracticable to preserve 
the rubber forests in the Benin City District unless there be a special European officer 
detailed for the work.” Officers had tried to deal with this, but their “enormous amount 
of other work” made it impossible to supervise the Native Inspectors. In his opinion, the 
matter was “pressing”, and “of great importance for the rubber forests in question are of 
very considerable extent and of great value.”21 
 
Further restrictions  
 
In 1899, the regulations were amended. The maximum imprisonment was extended 
to two years, and a closed season was imposed from December to June (Afigbo, 1970). 
The Forestry Department was created in 1900, and its chief concern “was the 
preservation of the extensive rubber forests in the Benin territories.” Acting High 
Commissioner Gallwey credited Hitchens, the Forestry Inspector, for the “very energetic 
manner in which he carried out this work, and for the successful efforts he made to 
educate the Binis to safeguard the rubber trees.”22 Hitchens reported that he had 
inspected and assessed the value of the rubber forests belonging to nearly 100 Bini 
villages, and created “staffs of ex-officio rubber inspectors” in each of them.23 He 
instructed locals in tapping, explained the regulations, and “constitute[ed] every Bini an 
ex-officio policeman to bring to justice any rubber gatherer infringing on the 
regulations.” In his view, the Bini “responded with alacrity,” exercising “such restraining 
influence on prohibited rubber-tapping and adulterated rubber-producing that not a 
single rubber gatherer is free from close ‘shadowing,’ and not a single ball of rubber and 
prohibited root rubber could work its undetected way to Lagos or our own trading 
factories.” 1900, the Forestry Proclamation was issued; this required licenses from the 
District Commissioner, outlined the permitted methods of tapping, and applied to all 
persons, not only foreigners (Afigbo, 1970, p. 390) 
At first, these appeared to work. More than £700 was collected as license fees from 
Benin in 1900.24 The Acting High Commissioner noted a fall in rubber exports in 1902, 
arguing timber had attracted “many who formerly collected rubber, and the legislation 
which has stopped the destruction of rubber trees is probably a second cause which 
                                                          
18 Regina v. Peter, Regina v. Bujlu (?) Abudu Ipede, and Regina v. Oriegbe, respectively. 
19 Regina v. Osun and Abiomo; no reason is given for why charges are dismissed. 
20 NAUK, FO 2/185; Oct 26, 1898: Gallwey to Salisbury. 
21 NAUK, FO 2/185; 17 Feb, 1899: Moor to Under-Secretary of State. 
22 Southern Nigeria Annual Report 1899/00, p. 9. 
23 Southern Nigeria Annual Report 1899/00, p. 9. 
24 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1900, p. 14. 
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accounts for the decline.”25 In 1904, High Commissioner Egerton suggested the Forestry 
Department was “fully organized and capable of exercising an efficient control over 
timber cutting and, in a lesser degree, over the proper tapping of rubber-bearing 
plants.”26 
Thompson, the Conservator of Forests, wrote in 1906 in glowing terms about the 
license system. He felt the rubber rules were working “very smoothly” in the Central 
Province, where the chiefs had taken “an active interest in protecting their forests, and 
the inhabitants are becoming very law-abiding in this respect.” 27 1114 licenses were 
issued, resulting in £671 10s paid. 645 of these were given in Benin City.  
The regulations were, however, ultimately unsuccessful. The Annual Report for 1908 
was gloomy, stating that “[r]ubber appears to be a rapidly decaying business ... the 
Southern production in 1908 was 713,000 lbs. only, as compared with 1,656,000 lbs. in 
1907. … the reckless destruction of trees by excessive bleeding is largely responsible for 
the drooping business.” Despite this, there were only 12 prosecutions and 10 
convictions under the rubber rules. The 1913 report for Benin commented on a falling 
off in rubber exports, blaming this on prices and “the fact that the wild rubber is much 
scarcer than formerly.”28 British regulations had not stopped resource exhaustion. 
 
State capacity 
 
Why did these fail? I argue that the state lacked the capacity to enforce them. First, 
production was difficult to police. Second, the British weakened the existing state and 
the local system of property rights, lacking the trust and resources necessary to replace 
these. Though open-access exploitation of a natural resource implies over-harvesting in 
excess of the “first-best” outcome, this may still be preferable to enforcement of feasible 
effort restrictions from the perspective of a social planner (Copeland and Taylor, 2009). 
In Benin, low probabilities of detection and the short time horizons of migrant tappers 
reduced the government’s enforcement capacity, while tappers’ destructive techniques 
raised their harvest capacity.  
The regulations diverted some trade from Benin to Lagos as early as 1901.29 Because 
Northern Nigeria had no similar regulations, rubber was also smuggled to the North 
(Egboh, 1985, p. 57). In 1901, a representative of Miller Brothers wrote that “[f]ew of 
those who bring down rubber” were “able to give a detailed account of its history from 
the time of manufacture, as it may have passed through many hands before reaching 
theirs.” Rubber was sold in many markets on its way to the coast, and “many of the 
rubber traders here are preparing to leave the district as they profess themselves 
unable any longer to conduct business here under the vexatious conditions in force.” 
                                                          
25 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1902, p. 21. 
26 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904, p. 4. 
27 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 31. 
28 NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province. 
29 NAUK, CO 520/9. 17 Oct, 1901: Acting High Commissioner to Secretary of State 
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Though every Edo was eligible for a reward of £2 for any conviction, the people had not 
looked after their own interests, in his view.30 
In 1905, the Governor recognized that prohibitions on root rubber were no longer 
enforced.31 Christy (1911) pointed out that, while 221,566 lbs were exported from 
Southern Nigeria in 1907, only £53/10 was collected in license fees.32 It was impossible 
that 107 license holders could be responsible for this quantity, so the bulk must have 
been illicit. Even if the forestry staff were increased fifty times, he thought it would be 
impossible to police the area: 
 
So long as the native can sell his ‘lump’ rubber at an enormous profit, so long 
will he continue his destructive methods of tapping, and his dirty, primitive 
system of preparation, despite voluminous rules and regulations, which he 
could not understand, even supposing them ever to reach himself or his chief 
(Christy, 1911, p. 13). 
 
Ostrom (1991) argues that effective resource management requires defined 
boundaries, easy identification of those with user rights, rules appropriate to local 
conditions, accountable monitors, graduated sanctions, rapid and low-cost conflict 
resolution, and recognition of users’ rights to devise their own institutions. British 
conquest weakened Benin’s borders, rules were imposed by an external authority 
without local participation, colonial agents lacked accountability, and courts in Benin 
City were eager to impose maximum penalties. 
Before 1897, Edo villages could control access to their forest resources. Outside his 
own village, an Edo obtained permission from the local Enogie or Odionwere to use the 
forest, until he settled permanently (Bradbury, 1957, p. 45). Hunters, “native and non-
native” turned the hand of any animal caught to the Enogie, and the Oba was owed a leg 
and tusk of any elephant killed (Egharevba, 1949, p. 43-44). Non-Edo were required to 
settle and assimilate (Bradbury, 1957, p. 45).  
Before 1897, the Oba had successfully prevented outsiders from working rubber in 
Benin. Miller’s agent at Ughoton informed the consul in 1896 that, while there was 
“plenty” of rubber in the country, he was unable to get a “rubber man” from Cape Coast 
to collect it, since he would not go far from Ughoton, having been twice “maltreated 
while away in the bush” (Ryder, 1969, p. 277). In 1896, a Lagos man went to the Oba on 
the advice of the Commissioner, Moor, “with a view to asking the King to start the 
‘rubber’ industry, the country abounding in that product.” Phillips reported that the 
man offered presents worth more than £30, but had no success.33  
An 1896 editorial in the Lagos Weekly Record asserted Oba’s power make “short 
work” of intruders, wishing that “the greedy rubber hunters” in the Lagos hinterland 
                                                          
30 NAUK, CO 520/9, 13 July, 1901: McLucas and Schaumburg (for Miller Bros and Bey & Zimmer) to Moor 
31 NAUK, CO 520/30, 5March, 1905: Egerton to Lyttelton. 
32 Though this contradicts the figure in the Annual Report, the figure in that report is larger, making the 
argument stronger. 
33 NAUK, FO 2/102. 16 Nov, 1896: Phillips to Under-Secretary of State. 
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“should one and all be dispatched to the domains of the expeditious King of Benin” 
(quoted by Ofonagoro (1979, p. 120)). This was not speculative talk. Members of the 
British punitive expedition in 1897 found a gang of nine outsiders who had gone to 
Benin to collect rubber. Despite being armed with revolvers, they had been taken 
prisoner and held in Benin for two months, bound so they would hang themselves were 
they to lie down (Ling Roth, 1903, p. 68). Similarly, in February 1897, Moor reported 
that six “Accra men, captured in the Mahin country rubber collecting during the last few 
months, came in from the bush heavily ironed”.34 
The 1908 trade report reached a similar conclusion; the situation was not adequate 
to protect rubber trees from destruction: 
 
[N]ot until rubber trees are owned by individuals, who will see that they are 
duly protected, can this industry be looked upon as a permanent one in 
Nigeria. Thousands of trees in the forests, which are practically a ‘no man’s 
land,’ are destroyed each year by overtapping, and although every effort is 
made by the Forestry Department, with the staff at its command, to regulate 
the gathering and to prevent indiscriminate bleeding, the task in so large a 
country and amidst dense forests is, it must be admitted, and extremely 
difficult one.35 
 
The colonial Forest Guards were inadequate and corrupt. In 1899, the defendant in 
Regina v. Amidu36 was charged with seizing a government rubber inspector. The 
inspector came across a “large gang of Lagos rubber cutters.” The defendant captured 
the inspector and his two carriers, tied them up, and flogged him. The Resident 
complained in 1901 that the “ignorance of some of the native rubber Inspectors may 
also have had something to do with the failure of last year’s sowing... Three of these men 
have lately brought into Benin City seed in a green and half grown condition, absolutely 
useless and of course wasted. One would-be Rubber Inspector was a small boy about 14 
who would be of about much use as a process server in Ireland of the same age.”37 In 
1907, Egerton noted their frequent abuses of power (not stating what these were), 
writing that “there are the strongest objections to the multiplication of native Forest 
guards with semi police powers carrying on their work in places far away from 
European supervision.”38 
These problems mirrored those of other wild rubber producers in Africa. The worst 
destruction occurred where it was impossible to keep out interlopers. In the Congo, 
concessionary companies were willing to make short-term profits and go bust, giving 
their agents incentives to over-exploit local vines (Harms, 1975). Around Lagos and 
Ibadan, slaughter-tapping may have been introduced by Fante workers imported by the 
                                                          
34 NAUK, FO 881/7002: Feb 24, 1897: Moor to Salisbury. Presumably, “ironed” means “in irons.” 
35 Quoted in Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 12 
36 NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899. 
37 NAUK, CO 520/7, 26/2/1901: Resident Benin City to Moor. 
38 NAUK, CO 520/45: Minute Dated 12 April, 1907 by Egerton. 
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governor (Omosini, 1979). In French Guinea, officials worried that “bandit” rubber 
collectors, who roamed the countryside in search of vines, were responsible for 
bleeding them to death (Osborn, 2004), Similarly, locals in the Ivory Coast complained 
that they were unable to prevent itinerant harvesters from extracting as much rubber as 
possible before moving on (Harms, 1975, p. 76). 
Over-tapping also followed the weakening of African states. Dumett (1971) 
emphasizes that the destruction of rubber was less severe in Asante than around Cape 
Coast. Around Kumasi, tappers often obtained forest on arrangement from local chiefs, 
who demanded fees or shares (Dumett, 1971, p. 98).39 In Benin, the British exiled the 
Oba and freed many of slaves on whom the chiefs depended (Igbafe, 1975). Other 
political functions defined in relation to the king became meaningless. As Bradbury 
(1973, p. 86) puts it, “British administrators at Benin had to construct an administrative 
bricolage out of their own meagre resources of personnel and the fragments of a 
shattered indigenous polity.” 
In Brazil, by contrast, property rights over wild rubber were well established. This 
was facilitated by the strength of the Brazilian state, which had declared independence 
in 1822, and was thus much older than the colonial government in Benin. The existence 
of owners with longer-term interests in the estates who could exclude outside tappers 
limited the extent of overtapping. Para was largely collected from estates along rivers, 
owned by tappers, by patrons, or by commercial firms (Barham and Coomes, 1994b, p. 
55).40 The creation of rubber trails that connected wild trees helped to establish 
property rights over them (Weinstein, 1983, p. 158). Patrons often resided on the 
estates, lowering monitoring costs (Barham and Coomes, 1994b, p. 55). It was the 
owner who brought labour in to the estate (Frank and Musacchio, 2006, p. 277). 
Critically, this allowed estate owners to select the contractual arrangement by which 
tappers were hired. Coomes and Barham (1994a,b) suggest that the typical debt-
merchandise contract was selected to minimize risks and transactions costs, and to 
economise on the scarcest factors of production – labour and capital. Critically, estate 
owners avoided rental contracts, since these would have given tappers incentives to 
over-tap their trees (Coomes and Barham, 1994, p. 246). 
Labour scarcity 
 
These difficulties were compounded by Benin’s scarcity of labour. The population 
density of Benin was estimated at only 25 per sqm in 1927.41 In rubber, monitoring was 
made more costly by a lack of monitors. Slaughter tapping may be interpreted as 
another of the labour-saving production techniques used throughout Africa (Austin, 
2008). Ofonagoro (1979, p. 223), for example, notes that “gathering wild rubber was by 
no means an easy job,” and that it might take several days to gather even a pound of 
                                                          
39 See also Arhin (1980) and Austin (2005) for rubber in Ashanti. 
40 See also Weinstein (1983, p. 45-48) for land tenure. 
41 NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division. 
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rubber. This also helps explain why migrants from the more densely settled Yoruba 
regions of Nigeria were the dominant producers of wild rubber during this period. 
 I do not believe, however, that labour-scarcity alone can explain the pervasiveness of 
over-exploitation. Destructive tapping was employed by non-Edo, and Benin 
successfully prevented similar problems before 1897, despite high prices. Further, 
similar environmental degradation has followed even in densely-settled areas when 
states have undermined existing institutions – the post-colonial dismantling of common 
property regimes over water and forestry in Tanzania serves as an example (Sheridan, 
2004).  
Though Brazil succeeded in producing wild rubber despite labour scarcity, this did 
influence tapping methods in different sectors of the industry. Tappers who collected 
Para rubber did not work the trees to death. These could be tapped repeatedly, 
providing income throughout an entire season. By contrast, caucho  rubber occurred 
more sparsely, and would not survive repeated tapping. Mobile teams of workers would 
fell these trees in areas where property rights were not established, drain them of latex, 
and move on (Barham and Coomes, 1994b, p. 45-46). Nigerian Funtumia is analogous to 
caucho. Circulars issued during the Second World War advised locals not to tap the 
trees more than three or four times per year, while other officials were even more 
cautious.42 For the mobile non-Edo who exploited Benin’s wild rubber, methods that 
killed the trees economised on scarce labour.  
 
4. PRIVATE PLANTATIONS 
 
Local Funtumia could be planted, and Brazilian Para had been introduced to Nigeria 
in 1895 (Anschel, 1965, p. 49). By 1921, however, plantations had not transformed 
Nigeria into the major producer it later become. In this section, I outline the difficulties 
faced by private plantations. European plantations were few, because of labour scarcity 
and government hostility to concessions. African private plantations are of limited 
visibility in the archival record, but also appear to have been small and faced similar 
challenges securing labour. This contrasts with the rubber industry’s ease in attracting 
labour in Asia, buttressed by favourable colonial policies over land and immigration. 
They also contrast with the more labour-abundant Benin that emerged as a successful 
exporter of rubber 1945. 
The literature on rubber plantations in Africa during this period is sparse. The most 
substantial treatment has come from Munro (1981,1983). He treats this episode as one 
in which European capital failed to create lasting transformation. In West Africa, his 
explanation focuses on the conservatism of British trading companies and on the 
absence of a “proprietary planter frontier” that bore the costs of experimentation 
(Munro, 1981, p. 276). Here, I explain this lack of a “planter frontier” by appealing to the 
                                                          
42 NAUK, CO 852 515 7: Commodities Rubber Nigeria. For the circular, see West African Rubber Mission 
Report on Nigeria and British Cameroons, Appendix 2. For the more cautious official, see 19 May 1943: 
Comments on Recommendations made by RM, March 1943 by The Custodian of Enemy Property, R.B. 
Longe. He recommended Funtumia not be tapped more than twice a year. 
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region’s scarcity of labour and the policies of the colonial state. In East Africa, he 
stresses the low yields obtained from local rubber varieties. I note that this was also a 
problem for Benin’s communal plantations in Section 5. Private plantations in Benin, 
however, encountered difficulties even when planted to Para. Other works (Fieldhouse, 
1994; Igbafe, 1979; Usuuanlele, 2003) have noted that private plantations existed in 
Benin, but have not discussed the difficulties they faced. I present new archival evidence 
on these constraints. 
 
Overview 
 
The greatest effort by a European firm to plant rubber in Benin was by Miller 
Brothers. The firm acquired roughly five hundred acres at Sapele in 1905, and another 
560 in 1911.43 This Para plantation was begun with 10,000 seeds imported from the 
East.44 Cowan, the director, testified to the West African Lands Committee (WALC) in 
1913 that 800 acres were under cultivation and the bulk of the 400 labourers did not 
come from Benin or Sapele, but rather from the more land-scarce Opobo, Kwa, and 
Ibibio territories (WALC, 1916, p. 468-475). 
In 1915, a return of agricultural plantations in Benin province listed five – J.G.M 
Cranstoun and Company’s at Sapoba, Messrs. MacIver’s at Sapoba, I.T. Palmer’s at 
Sapoba and Abraka, and the Nigerian Mahogany and Trading Company’s at Unutu.45 
MacIver and Palmer (an African) were both said to have rubber in good condition at this 
time. Egboh (1985, p. 159) states that Cranstoun had two plantations in 1908, totalling 
1,280 acres. MacIver reported in 1917 that they were doing no business in rubber, 
though their plantation caught the attention of Macmillan (1920, p. 73) and by 1927 
their holdings had expanded to 2021 acres.46 This and Cranstoun’s were later taken 
over by the United Africa Company, becoming the Jamieson Estate Plantation (Pedler, 
1974, p. 246). Miller’s estate at Sapele later became UAC property as well (Fieldhouse, 
1994, p. 204-5). 
Others were less successful. A German firm, possibly Bey and Zimmer, planted ten 
acres that were surrendered during the First World War (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 59). The 
African Association start an experimental Para plantation in 1906 at Warri, but James 
believed that they “[did] not seem to have pushed the matter further.”47 In 1908, they 
had an “excellent small Para rubber plantation at Eket.”48 The British Cotton Growing 
                                                          
43 NAI, BP 311/1914: Rubber Plantation on the Ologbo Road, 18 March, 1911: Provincial Commissioner 
Warri to Provincial Commissioner Calabar. 
44 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1905, p. 24. 
45 NAI, BP 603 1915 Agricultural Plantations Benin Province. Two lists are given in this file; the first omits 
Cranstoun, the second MacIver. 
46 For 1917, see NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division, 16 Nov, 1917: Howe (for 
MacIver and Co) to Acting District Officer. For 1927, see NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin 
Division. 
47 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 38.  
48 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 15. 
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Association started a plantation in Benin territory in 1909, but in 1917 it was 
“neglected,” containing only 228 trees.49 
Less is knowable about plantations owned by Africans.50 The Annual Reports and 
Igbafe (1979) take an upbeat view. In 1903, some “more intelligent chiefs” had started 
operations on their own account.51 In 1906, the Provincial Forest Officer stated that the 
“feature of the year ... [had] been the number of small private plantations made by 
individual natives, although it [was] difficult to say exactly how many [had] been 
made.”52 Igbafe (1979, p. 343-348) notes that 126 villages had been convinced to start 
plantations by the end of 1903, there were 369 private plantations by 1906, and that 
some 3,000 acres were owned by eleven private individuals or companies by 1925. The 
largest of these belonged to Palmer, reported to have 1500 acres at Abraka, employing 
900 labourers who were paid the same wages as in the timber industry (WALC, 1916, p. 
468-475).53 The Obaseki had two Para plantations, of 10,000 and 12,000 trees, 4 to 6 
years old in 1919.54 
Before 1921, however, most of these must have been small. Chief Ugo had a single 
acre at Benin (Egboh, 1985, p. 159). Thompson described those planted in the Benin 
City District in 1906 as “small private plantations.”55 A 1917 return of Para plantations 
in Benin forwarded a list excluding those with less than 20 trees, and “small private 
plantations of which there is no record”. It listed 270 started in 1914 or 1915, with 57 
seedlings planted on average. 
 
Labour scarcity 
 
Private plantations had difficulty securing labour. Cowan told the WALC that his 
company did not use Edo labourers because, though they could make arrangements 
with headmen, the people were unwilling and would work for at most six months. He 
believed this was because the authority of the Benin chiefs had declined. Labour 
scarcity in Benin was also a result of low population density, exacerbated by competing 
demands from the state for road work and porters, and from timber concessions.  
African plantations faced similar difficulties. Cowan told the WALC that there were six 
African owned Para plantations of 10,000 to 30,000 trees in the Sapele district. They 
had been paying for labour by allowing workers to plant “catch crops” among the trees, 
and as a result, the rubber had suffered. In his view, they had “tried to make the thing 
pay as they went along, and they have been pennywise and pound foolish” (WALC, 
1916, p 468-475). 
                                                          
49 NAI, BP 175/1917, Para Rubber Plantations, 19 June, 1917: D.O. Ubiaja to Resident. 
50 Usuanlele (2003, p. 60) lists Lawani Bokoni, W.A. Sagay, S.D. Garrick, Bello Osagie (a Yoruba, an Itsekiri, 
a Kalabari, and a Benin trader) as having plantations of “various sizes” during this period, though he does 
not specify what they planted. 
51 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1903, p. 19. 
52 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17. 
53 Pedler (1974, p. 246) identified him as a Sierra Leonean who had previously been an agent for the RNC. 
54 NAI, Ben Prof 2/6 BP 480 19: Agricultural Department Report. 
55 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17. 
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The difficulties faced by rubber planters in Benin echo those of other attempts to 
create rubber plantations in Africa during this period. Three companies acquired land to 
plant rubber in the Gold Coast in 1905-6, but could not compete with cocoa farms and 
gold mines for labour (Munro, 1981, p. 271). In East Africa, expatriate planters had 
expected cheap labour, but within months of starting “all were complaining loudly and 
bitterly about their labour difficulties” (Munro, 1983, p. 374). 
This was, by contrast, a period during which estates and smallholders in Asia 
successfully expanded production. Clarence-Smith (2010), contrasting rubber’s success 
in Indonesia with its failure in the Congo, emphasizes that Sumatran smallholders, like 
successful Benin planters later on, recruited the labour of migrant sharecroppers. Large 
planters stated that they had left the Congo for Asia because of inadequate transport 
facilities and labour supply. Estates in Ceylon, Malaya and Sumatra were worked by 
immigrants from India and Java, while estates in Borneo and French Indo-China 
similarly relied on migrants (Bauer, 1948, p. 217). The government actively supported 
the immigration of Tamil and Chinese labourers; the former were used in tapping while 
the latter opened new land (Barlow, 1978, p. 43-45, 51). Chinese labourers also became 
smallholders, developing two to four hectare blocks while working in mines or estates 
(Barlow, 1978, p. 39). The problems of labour supply that hindered Brazilian 
plantations will be discussed below. 
Contrasted with Southeast Asia, Benin was labour scarce. Frankema and van 
Waijenburg (2010) shown that real wages in West Africa were above those prevailing in 
South India and China, the major sources of migrant labour in Southeast Asia. Benin was 
less populous than the major production centres of Sumatra and Malaysia. While 
population density in Benin was had a population density of roughly 20.7 persons per 
square mile in 1911 or 25 per square mile in 1927, Sumatra had a density of some 33.7 
persons per square mile in 1928, while this figure was 29.5 persons for Malaysia.56 
Accounts of the economic institutions governing land and labour in pre-colonial Benin 
have stressed that they were largely shaped by labour scarcity (Usuanlele, 1988, p. 6, 
21, 22; Rowling, 1948, p. 4; Blanckenburg, 1963, p. 13; Igbafe, 1979, p. 28). Coping with 
this sparse population was one of the principal challenges faced by the British before 
the First World War (Usuanlele, 1988, p. 216-220). By contrast, histories of rubber in 
Southeast Asia have stressed the “critical contribution” of the influx of labour that was 
made possible by international migrant flows: see Barlow (1978, p. 29), Bauer (1948, p. 
217), or Drabble (1973, p. 93-94). This was, as Caggiano and Huff (2007) show, a period 
in which globalization in Asia was defined by an integrated labour market that stretched 
from South India to Southeastern China. This provided a mobile, cheap labour force. No 
migrants were forthcoming before 1921 to resolve Benin’s scarcity of labour.  
Benin’s success later on can also be partly explained by relaxation of the labour 
constraint, due to population growth, land annexation, and immigration. Usuanlele 
(1988, p. 249-254) argues that direct taxes introduced in 1916 created a need for cash 
                                                          
56 Population density in 1911 is from NAUK, CO 879/117/9–10, Minutes of Evidence of the West African 
Lands Committee, p. 164. Population density in 1927 is from NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on 
Benin Division. Population densities for Sumatra and Malaysia come from populstat.info. 
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income; the state had discovered a method for labour recruitment. Further, he suggests 
that land annexations by chiefs, urban residents, and forest reserves encouraged 
individuals to plant trees on fallow plots to claim them permanently. These pressures 
combined with influx of Igbo willing to work as share tappers. 
 
State capacity 
 
In addition, the British were reticent to grant concessions to Europeans for working 
produce that Africans could exploit on their own. The African Association and Miller 
were both rejected for concessions in 1898 (Afigbo, 1970, p. 392). Officials such as Moor 
and Gallwey opposed these, preferring “development by the natives themselves.”57 
Evans’ application to rent communal plantations was turned down in 1911 (Egboh, 
1985, p. 158). By Pedler’s (1974, p. 245-6) account, Miller only acquired land after 
Cowan spoke with Egerton, who had recently come from Malaya and was disappointed 
that merchants in Nigeria seemed to be showing no comparable initiative in developing 
rubber. Where other individuals or firms acquired land, these were exceptions that had 
“resulted from land transactions carried out by African chiefs before the policy of the 
protectorate government had been well established.” Phillips (1989) argues that the 
British came to favour “peasants” over “plantations” in West Africa for a long list of 
reasons bound together by the stability of indirect rule. British hegemony depended on 
the power of local chiefs, and their control over access to “communal” land was seen as 
integral to their authority. Land policy was part of the set of practical responses to the 
problem of imposing authority despite the “scarcity of money and manpower” that 
confronted colonial states (Berry, 1992, p. 328). 
These difficulties were not unique to Benin. Prospective rubber planters elsewhere in 
West Africa found the colonial office unwilling to grant them monopolies even to collect 
wild rubber (Munro, 1981). Firestone’s success in Liberia came later. He gained 
concessions from the Liberian government in both land and tariffs that firms in British 
West Africa could not (Finlay, 2009, p. 77). These factors also gave Asia an edge. Land 
was more readily available to expatriates. The government in Malaya granted land to 
Chinese tapioca and gambier planters on the condition they also plant rubber (Jackson, 
1968, p. 228). Malay residents sold their ancestral lands to estate groups and other 
outside interests (Barlow, 1978, p. 39).  
 
5. COMMUNAL PLANTATIONS 
 
The colonial government established thousands of small plantations of mostly 
Funtumia rubber throughout Benin, owned by local communities. It was the colonial 
government that chose the name “communal plantations”. It was indented that 
proceeds would be divided into thirds, shared between the government, the chiefs, and 
                                                          
57 NAUK, FO 2/179: 28 July, 1898: Gallwey to Under-Secretary of State. See also his letter from 13 May, 
1898 in the same volume. 
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“the villagers”. Believing that Africans lacked the foresight to plant tree crops, the aim of 
the government in establishing these was to further the development of the rubber 
industry. Once it became clear that it would not be possible to preserve Benin’s wild 
rubber resources, government support of the plantations intensified (Egboh, 1985, p. 
159). 
 At first seen as promising, it was clear before the First World War that these were in 
trouble. They suffered from labour scarcity and a colonial state that lacked staff and 
resources, was unable to transfer skills and information, and could not forecast future 
prices. Many of the same constraints restrained the development of rubber plantations 
in Brazil during the same period. These difficulties, as shown above, contrast with the 
conditions that allowed Asian producers and later Edo smallholders to succeed. While 
Igbafe (1979) and Usuanlele (1988, 2003) have both discussed the communal 
plantations in their general histories, neither has provided an account of their operation 
or the difficulties they faced. I use new archival evidence to explain the failure of this 
development scheme. 
 
Initial promise 
 
In 1899, nurseries were established in a few district centres, so that plantations 
could be made to close to the villages. These would be used for seed to sow in the bush 
at the beginning of the rainy season.58 Of 450 miles of road existing in the Benin 
territories, the Forestry Inspector planted 250 with rubber seed.59 In 1900, twenty large 
nurseries were established in the Benin territories to supply seedlings.60 All villages 
receiving timber royalties were required to establish nurseries from 1901 (Igbafe, 
1979). 
Undergirding these efforts was paternalistic racism, made clear by Bedwell, the 
Acting Colonial Secretary, in 1903: 
 
It is not in the nature of the average West African to lay out capital for which 
there is no immediate return. He can understand the yam growing at his 
door; he can understand the cask of oil to be filled before his “boys” can 
return with the required cloth, pipe or frock-coat, but he will not sew for his 
son to reap; nor will a village work, of its own initiative, for the benefit of the 
next generation that is to occupy it. It is this difficulty that has rendered so 
great the task of encouraging the rubber industry.61 
 
                                                          
58 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1899-1900, p. 10. 
59 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1899-1900, p. 10. 
60 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1900, p. 14. 
61 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1903, p. 19. 
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The government distributed seeds and seedlings and oversaw tapping. The 
communal plantations were mostly Funtumia. 62  By the end of 1903, 145,000 plants 
had been established in 126 village plantations (Igbafe, 1979, p.343). There were 1,050 
communal plantations in the Province in 1906, 1629 in 1907, and 2251 in 1908 (Egboh, 
1985, p. 159). Similar efforts were made elsewhere in Southern Nigeria, though Benin 
was the model case.63 
These were initially seen as promising, and were encouraged by colonial officials. In 
1904, Egerton saw the boom in the rubber market and the development of trade as 
“gratifying,” and hoped improved methods would help prices eventually close on those 
paid for rubber from the Straits and Ceylon.64 Experiments were in progress to improve 
tapping.65 In 1905, Fosbery reported that rubber continued to show a “considerable 
increase,” predicting that “with systematic cultivation and collection it will become a 
valuable addition to the exports of the country.”66 In 1906, two pupils had just returned 
from the French School of Forestry in Mali.67 In 1908, there were 2,251 Funtumia 
plantations in the Central Province, containing 1,125,972 trees.68 In 1910, several 
thousand communal Funtumia plantations had become large enough to tap.69 Outside 
observers were impressed with these plantations; Christy (1911) reported that “[t]he 
system of native communal plantations so successful in Southern Nigeria is admirable, 
and should be adopted by all the west African colonies.” 
 
Labour scarcity 
 
Several problems were, however, already apparent before prices began to fall. 
Labour scarcity was apparent as early as 1901. That year, the Annual Report for 
Southern Nigeria noted that recent “changes in the social conditions of the natives of 
these territories, particularly with regard to slavery, render it certain that the capacity 
of these native carriers for their transport work is not likely to increase, at all events for 
some years to come, until a good native labour market is established.”70 In 1906, 
similarly, the Provincial Forest Officer reported that the Isoko and Urhobo were too 
involved in road-making to devote much time to plantations; where rubber had been 
taken up, palm oil had been abandoned.71 
                                                          
62 Secondary sources offer contradictory evidence. Igbafe (1979, p. 347) refers to Funtumia, while 
Usuanlele (2003, p. 58) states that the first plantations were Para, with Funtumia and Ceara “introduced” 
only in 1908. In the annual reports it is clear that Funtumia was the predominant variety: see the Report 
on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17, or the Southern Nigeria Annual Reports 
for 1907 (p. 11), 1908 (p. 15) or 1909 (p. 12). 
63 These are discussed in the Southern Nigeria Annual Reports for 1904 through 1911. 
64 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904, p. 19. 
65 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904, p. 24. 
66 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1905, p. 21. 
67 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 38. 
68 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 15. 
69 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1910, p. 14.  
70 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1901, p. 8. 
71 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17. 
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The 1913 Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations detailed five major problems 
that were causing them to fail: first, the weakened authority of the local chiefs; second, 
competing labour demand from other sectors, such as timber areas, government works, 
road construction, and porterage; third, insufficient incentives for the local 
communities, even when the government waived its one third claim to the plantations’ 
revenue in that year; fourth, villagers’ lack of experience with the product, which was 
made worse by deferred payoff of rubber as a tree crop, and; fifth, sharp labour 
demands that conflicted with seasonal festivals and funerals.72 Tapping had to be done 
during the rainy season, when villagers preferred to do farm work and rebuild their 
homes.73 Results on the model plantations, similarly, could only be achieved by 
“constantly worrying” the Obaseki and Edosomah for labour.74 
The next year, the report on the communal plantations noted that it was difficult 
getting upkeep work done: 
 
The village people have shown very plainly that they do not care for the 
plantations. The Forest guards report that they have the greatest difficulty in 
getting any cleaning or clearing done. At Uburu Uku the forest Guards had 
been driven away when they attempted to get the plantations cleaned. ... At 
Ogwashi Uku and Abah very few men would be persuaded to do the work 
which was done almost entirely by the Forest Guards.75 
 
Similarly, in Ishan, the people were disinclined to do the work requested, and officials 
felt they had been wasting their time. Especially in Asaba, Ifon and Ishan, officials had 
difficulty getting men to work. Many chiefs complained that, “as their power had been 
broken, it was hardly fair to make them responsible for the boys not working.”76 
Officials found these claims credible; Lugard (1914, p. 48) agreed that the suspension of 
the indigenous system of government had led the authority of both chiefs and family 
heads to decline. In addition to the work of tapping and upkeep, processing was labour 
intensive. Latex had to be cooked at central cooking camps and let stand for eighteen 
hours or more before it was ready to cook. For people from outlying villages, this was 
not worth the time involved, and they would not stay behind to learn how to properly 
cook the rubber.77 Officials recognized that their own labour requisitioning contributed 
to this scarcity of labour – the same report noted that the question of carriers “has been 
                                                          
72 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
Compounding this was the uncompromising scheduling of the Forestry Department. The report’s author 
wrote that villagers objected “to the pressure at which we have to make them work in order to get 
through the large number of scattered plantations in the season and usually would like use to wait some 
convenient time between their festivals and funerals for our visit.”  
73 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
74 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
Similarly, the state withheld royalties from Chiefs Eso, Oshodi and Obaseki in 1915 for failing to weed 
their plantations (Usuanlele, 1988, p. 222). 
75 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
76 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
77 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
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a difficult one. The Assistant Conservator of Forests is obliged to find his own carriers, 
except on leaving a station, to take him from village to village. These carriers are not 
paid and this does not help to make the rubber business any more popular.” In 1916, the 
Resident pointed out that it was not worthwhile for villages to send small quantities of 
rubber to Benin, and that they did not do so voluntarily.78 
The role of labour abundance in explaining the relative success of Asia has already 
been discussed above. Labour scarcity in Benin as a hindrance to rubber plantations 
mirrors the situation of Brazil. Coomes and Barham (1994, p. 253-256) suggest that the 
failure to develop plantations in Brazil stemmed from scarce labour, a high opportunity 
cost of capital (discussed below), and the long time to maturation for planted rubber. 
This list is echoed by Dean (1987, p. 39) and Weinstein (1983, p. 31-32), while Frank 
and Musacchio (2006, p. 275) similarly conclude that, “because Brazil was committed to 
a high-wage, labour-scarce production regime, it was in Southeast Asia that plantations 
developed.”79  Wages for plantation labourers in Brazil would have to have been 
competitive with the urban sector or with independent tapping, and high enough to 
discourage illicit sales. Daily wages in Asia were roughly one eighth those in Amazonia, 
and Asian labour had fewer outside options (Coomes and Barham, 1994, p. 253-256). In 
Asia, plantation labour was less mobile, there was no competing extractive sector, and 
cultivation areas were closer to the sources of imported food for the plantation workers 
(Barham and Coomes, 1994a, p. 100). Dean (1987. p. 65, p.81) acknowledges that 
labour scarcity was also encountered by planters in British Guiana, Surinam, and on 
Ford’s failed Brazilian plantation. 
 
State capacity 
 
Shortage of labour was not the only difficulty faced by the plantations. The state’s 
knowledge of agronomy was poor, and the decision to plant Funtumia rather than Para 
was a particularly harmful error. The colonial government was reliant on local chiefs to 
implement its programs, and these agents succeeded in appropriating the returns from 
the communal plantations. The state was short of the skilled staff and equipment 
needed by the plantations, and so found it difficult to transmit expertise to locals. 
Finally, the government had underestimated the effect of Asian production on world 
rubber markets. Similar difficulties held back the development of rubber plantations, 
both in Brazil and in East Africa. 
The colonial state was largely ignorant of agronomy. In particular, the decision to 
plant the communal plantations mostly to Funtumia was a major misstep. Some 
disadvantages had been discovered relatively early. The recuperative abilities of 
Funtumia were discovered to be less than that of Para as early as 1906.80 Some of the 
                                                          
78 NAI, Ben Prof 2/3 BP 523 1916: Proceeds from Rubber Sales; no date given, letter to Secretary, 
Southern Provinces. 
79 This is not a new view. Melby (1942) identifies labour scarcity as the principal obstacle to the 
development of Brazilian rubber.   
80 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 33. 
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plants showed difficulty pushing through the soil, leading to a high proportion of seeds 
to seedlings.81 It was, however, only after the onset of the First World War that the 
government realized the overall superiority of Para, which might give 300 lbs per acre, 
versus the 60 obtained from Funtumia (Egboh, 1985, p. 162).82 Similarly, Funtumia 
could not be tapped as frequently as Para; some officials suggested no more than twice 
per year.83 The Forestry Department decided by 1915 that the “extremely low yield of 
rubber from the Funtumia elastica, combined with its slow rate of growth” had 
rendered it an unprofitable crop.84 All new extensions to the communal plantations 
were to be planted in Para.85 By then it was too late, and the plantations were soon 
turned over to African control. 
Dean (1987) argues that South American Leaf Blight, which was endemic in South 
America but not in Asia, was the main factor that hindered plantation development in 
Brazil. Unfortunately, the historical record is too sparse to determine whether Funtumia 
was more susceptible to disease and pests in Benin than Para. The trees on the 
communal plantations did suffer from disease; in 1914, the presence of the canker 
nectria Funtumia was noted, especially in Ishan.86 Porcupines and crickets damaged the 
Funtumia planted in the Mamu reserve, in another part of Southern Nigeria.87 Christy 
(1911, p. 112) believed Funtumia was “remarkably free from diseases and pests,” and 
that nectria Funtumia canker and the root diseases Hymenochaete and Fomes 
semitosus, were the only serious diseases present. Insect pests also attacked the trees.88  
Colonial officials paid far more attention to the diseases and pests that attacked Para. 
In 1918, both bark disease and fungus were reported at McIver’ Para plantation at 
Sapoba.89 The same year, vegetable growths of a parasitic plant were found on the roots 
of Para trees at Sapele.90 A “serious fungus disease” was noted affecting the bark of 
tapped Para trees at Benin, Sapoba, Azumini and Kwale in 1918.91 Agricultural 
Department and Forestry Administration reports from 1912 through 1921 mention 
several threats to Para throughout Nigeria identified by the entomologist and 
                                                          
81 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 36. 
82 Colonial officials re-discovered some of this knowledge during the Second World War. While, according 
to their information, the best yields of 164-176 lbs per acre had been achieved in the Belgian Congo, the 
highest recorded yield in the Gold Coast was only 58 lbs (NAUK, CO 852/451/6: Commodities, Rubber, 
West Africa; Unsigned, undated memo “Funtumia Rubber”). 
83 NAUK, CO 852 515 7: Commodities Rubber Nigeria: 19 May 1943: Comments on Recommendations 
made by RM, March 1943 by The Custodian of Enemy Property, R.B. Longe; also NAI, BP 5 1915: Report 
on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
84 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
85 See also CO 657/3: Annual Report for the Forestry Departments, 1915, p. 13. 
86 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
87 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1901, p. 8. 
88 Christy (1911, p.119-12) lists Gall disease, the caterpillar leaf pest, the girdling beetle, the seed-pod 
maggot, thrips, scale insects, locusts, and driver ants as examples, though his discussion does not in all 
cases distinguish which pests exist in which countries.  
89 NAU, Ben Prof 2/6 BP 480 19: Agricultural Department Report. This was the plantation formerly 
belonging to Cranstoun. 
90 NAI, BP 645 19: Agricultural Department Annual Report. 
91 Nigeria Annual Report 1918, p. 8-9. 
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mycologist.92 These included termites, Polyporus lignosus, Fomes semitostus, Ustulina 
zonata, hymenochaete noxia, various stem diseases, and a fungus that resembled Brown 
Bast. None of these reports mention Funtumia, except to state that a parasitic plant 
infection affecting Para had earlier been noted in Funtumia.93  
Even taking the choice of Funtumia as given, colonial agronomy was poorly informed. 
The plantations only gave 0.9 to 1.5 oz per tree of dry rubber, though better yields in the 
Cameroons were achieved between 2.5 and 4.3 oz.94 In 1913, tapping took place 
between May 5 and November 14. In 1914, tapping on the communal plantations ran 
from May 30 to October 16, and had been delayed because no authority had been 
received from headquarters.95 Though this was not during the key bottleneck of 
seasonal farm clearing, this schedule did compete with farmers’ other labour 
requirements. Farms for planting yams, the most important food crop, were typically 
cleared in February and early March.96 Planting would begin in April and continue into 
May.  There would then be a pause before poles were inserted to support the yams in 
late May. Considerable labour was needed to induce yam tendrils to cling to the ropes 
supported by these poles. Farms were weeded once in July and again before the harvest, 
which would stretch from September through November as different varieties of yam 
matured at different points. After the yam harvest, farms were then replanted with 
maize and cassava. 
Trees over 14 inches in girth at 4 feet from the ground were tapped to a height of 20 
feet, with minor channels adjacent those laid out the previous year. Tapping was carried 
out on a half herring bone system. Christy (1911, p. 146), by contrast, had carried out 
experiments in Uganda and found that this was more laborious and, due to the vertical 
channels cut into the tree, more risky than the preferred double half spiral system. 
Similarly, experiments in the Mamu Forest Reserve within Nigeria had found the spiral 
system of tapping to be most suitable method for Funtumia (Egboh, 1985, p. 163). 
Locally made para knives were used. Christy (1911, p. 137) had found the “Funtumia 
knife,” a groover and pricker secured at opposite ends of a wooden handle to have many 
advantages that improved both healing and yield. Though he reported that it had been 
used in Southern Nigeria (p. 202-203), the lack of standardization in local manufacture 
will have introduced a greater risk of injury to the trees.  The Assistant Conservator of 
Forests attempted to ensure that tapping  was carried out under the supervision of the 
forest guards, though shortage of staff interfered.   
The latex was boiled, and the coagulant was then rolled into thin biscuits using a 
wooden roller on a table while being washed with hot water. These were then hung to 
dry and smoked in a long drying shed. Where officials had sufficient time, the 
                                                          
92 CO 657/1 through CO 657/8. 
93 The report guessed that it was Thonningia sanguinea. 
94 NAUK, CO 852 515 7: Commodities Rubber Nigeria: West African Rubber Mission Report on Nigeria and 
British Cameroons, Appendix 2, Wild Rubber Production in Nigeria. 
95 Details of operations in the communal plantations are taken from NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the 
Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 and NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: 
Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914, and the Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1910.  
96 Details of the farming cycle are from Bradbury, 1957, p. 23-24. 
JAMES FENSKE 
 
25 
 
plantations were thinned to remove trees that were dead, crooked, whips, wolves, or 
those stifling the growth of those around them. Originally, large trees had been left 
standing and were later girdled; in 1913 they were creating “havoc” when they fell. The 
plantations had also suffered significant wind damage, especially near roads and 
clearings. 
While the proceeds of the plantations were supposedly to be split between the 
government and the local communities, their benefits went largely to the chiefs. This 
was true also of the model Para plantation on the road between Benin City and Sapele, 
which was owned by eighteen Benin City chiefs who had “provided the labour for it 
free.”97 Lugard, similarly, believed that “communal” labour meant “forced” labour, and 
opposed the plantations on these grounds (Egboh, 1985, p. 160). In 1924, the Resident 
chastised the Oba, requesting the District Officer to inform him that if his workers were 
“called upon to work for nothing, it simply means that they will leave their villages, and 
either seek employment with the timber concessionaires or elsewhere outside the 
division.”98 Bradbury (1973) notes that chiefs received one third of the wages paid for 
labourers they requisitioned, and a share of the profits from rubber. Some were still 
profiting from these plantations as late as the 1950s, though this hurt their legitimacy.  
A plantation established by the Forestry Department near Usonigbe had been turned 
over to the local villages around 1910, but in 1914 was appropriated by the Oba. His 
successor was leasing it to Palmer for tapping in 1937.99 A Para plantation on Sapele 
Road that had been damaged by fire was turned over to the Iyashere in 1916, since he 
was the only chief who had shown interest in it.100 One official remarked that “looking at 
it from a business profit and loss point of view the communal plantations have so far 
been a failure, except to the chiefs.”101  
In addition, the colonial state was short of human and physical capital – the trained 
staff and equipment needed by the communal plantations. The supply of seed was not 
always reliable; seeds imported from Cameroon failed to germinate, while poor 
germination had lowered the number of Funtumia planted in Southern Nigeria from 
234,878 in 1907 to 133,094 in 1908. Of the 622 plantations formed during that year, 
most were extensions to existing ones.102 Before 1911, thinning had been neglected, and 
the trees needed each other’s support to stand.103 At Agbor and Asaba, while thinning 
was desperately needed, there was no staff to do the work. The report for 1913 
admitted neglect by the government, stating that “it is a breach of good faith and fair 
dealing to have started these rubber plantations as a native industry and leave them, 
now when maturing and needing thinning, tapping etc under European supervision.”104 
                                                          
97 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
98 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division. 18 Feb, 1924: Resident to District Officer. 
99 NAI, Ben Dist 1 BD 84 Vol 2: Usonigbe Native Court and District Affairs: 16 March, 1937: Palmer to DO; 
handwritten note by Jull. 
100 NAI, Ben Prof 2/5 BP 173/1916 Communal Rubber Plantation Management of. 9Nov, 1916: 
Conservator of Forests Benin Circle to Resident Benin Province. 
101 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
102 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 15. 
103 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
104 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
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Lugard (1914, p. 55) identified this as a general problem in Benin, where “the 
outstanding fact with regard to these districts is that the officers are so full of routine 
work that they have not sufficient time for other work.” 
Similarly, Miller had obtained permission in 1916 to tap 400 Para trees on the 
Sapoba road, at a cost of 1s per tree for a season, but reported to the government that it 
had been unable to tap these because it was difficult to find a European supervisor, 
children and livestock interfered, and there were too few trees to justify smoke and 
drying sheds.105 
The District Officer worried that the villages were “disappointed with the results of 
their labour.”106 In Ishan in 1913, the Forestry Department was unable to tap the 93 
communal plantations.107 At times, one Forest Guard and one pupil had to supervise 
twenty men.108 That year, the senior Conservator of Forests suspended tapping “on the 
ground that the trees need rest, and the Forestry Department is short of officers.”109 In 
1917, there were no funds to supervise preparation and assist in the sale of rubber at 
Ubiaja.110 
In 1917, the government had to borrow pans, metal spoons, tapping knives, rollers, 
cog wheels, fittings, and bottles of acetic acid from Miller Brothers.111 Local tapping 
knives were “slow and bad,” though by 1914 a local “native imitation” of Para knives 
had been devised.112 Smoking facilities were inadequate, and could not prevent the 
cured rubber from becoming mouldy.113 The two smoking sheds at Benin City were 
poorly built, lacked proper heating and drying facilities, and were in constant danger of 
catching fire.114 
It was, then, difficult for the colonial government to transmit new skills related to 
plantation management, tapping methods, and output quality. Though this is indicative 
of the weakness of the colonial state, it is not clear that this put Benin at a disadvantage 
relative to Southeast Asia. There, the colonial state also struggled to transmit new 
knowledge. The Rubber Research Institute of Malaya suffered from financial and 
administrative problems during the 1920s, and was reticent to encourage estates to 
adopt higher-yielding varieties (Drabble, 1991, p. 46, 56). Similarly, the advice given to 
smallholders to selectively thin their plots and tap less intensively was not suited to the 
structure of costs they faced (Drabble, 1991, p. 87). 
In Benin, much plant distribution had to be done from the Onitsha Gardens. As early 
as 1906, it was recognized that this was too dry and too far from the centres in which 
                                                          
105 NAI, BP 510 1916 Para Trees Benin City Arrangement with Regard to Tapping, 12 Oct 1916: Herald to 
DO Benin City 
106 NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province. 
107 NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province. 
108 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
109 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
110 AI, Ben Prof 2/4: BP 403 17: Village Rubber Plantation, 3 July, 1917: District OfficerUbiaja to Resident, 
Benin and 9 Aug, 1917: Resident to Distirct Officer Ubiaja. 
111 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division. 
112 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
113 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 270 1917: Sale of Village Rubber Plantation, 28 March, 1917: District Officer to 
Resident. 
114 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
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cocoa and Para rubber could be successfully cultivated.115 One officer reported in 1913 
on the difficulty of making the work carried out conform to instructions, writing that the 
“native idea of a clean plantation is often opposed to all Forest ideas of soil protection 
and the arrival of a Forest Officer often leads to the plantation being swept and scraped 
bare of all needful and protecting surface soil and humus.”116 Individual rubber samples 
mentioned in colonial correspondence were often poor – in 1918 samples of locally 
grown rubber were reported to be “anything but good, and it is evident if the best 
results are to be obtained, that the Beni ‘Planter’ requires both advice and 
supervision.”117  
Scarce equipment was similarly a problem for Brazil. Much of the capital that had 
been initially invested in wild rubber production in Brazil was unsuitable for plantation 
development; steamboats and the accounts receivable from tappers could not be easily 
converted into plantation equipment (Dean, 1987. p. 50). 
While initially proposed as a year-to-year arrangement, the waiving of the 
government’s share of the revenues from the communal plantations soon became 
permanent.118 Officials realized that the failure to anticipate the collapse of the world 
market was a major oversight on their part; the 1914 report on the communal 
plantations noted that: 
 
The possibility, in fact probability of a fall in the price of rubber was evidently 
not taken into consideration when these operations were started...A second 
and very important point is that the natives have not taken up the plantations 
with much enthusiasm. Every year the returns have been smaller and, most 
important of all, the natives have been kept waiting many months before 
receiving payment.119 
 
This echoed the failure of British planters in East Africa to forecast the magnitude of 
the impact that Asian production would have on world prices (Munro, 1983, p. 373). In 
Brazil, forecasts were similarly misguided. The peak years of price uncertainty coincided 
with the boom in worldwide automobile production. Producers believed that demand 
would increase at a rising pace, only to be find that technological change in rubber tyres 
dampened this growth (Frank and Musacchio, 2006, p. 280-288). As prices fell, higher-
cost producers such as those in Benin were the first to be pushed out. 
The government admitted failure. The same report recommended turning the 
plantations over to the local villages, noting that it would not be remunerative to work 
them with paid labour. In 1916, the Forestry Department ceased to exercise any control 
over the plantations, and the commissioner of the Benin Province requested the District 
Officer to inform the “native owners” that “it is now their duty to carry on the work 
                                                          
115 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 41. 
116 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
117 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division. 12 Dec, 1917: Herald toWatt. 
118 NAI, BP 76 1914: Communal Plantations Central Province; 16 Dec, 1913: Colonial Secretary to 
Conservator of Forests. 
119 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
RUBBER IN BENIN, 1897-1921 
28 
 
themselves without regular supervision and assistance.”120 Proceeds were then divided 
between the Native Authority and the villages.121  
Both labour shortage and the weakness of the colonial state were exacerbated by the 
First World War. Terms of trade turned against Nigerians, beginning a long interwar 
period of adverse prices (Martin, 1989). Nigerians faced a scarcity of shipping and 
inflation that continued into the interwar period (Yearwood, 1998, p. 49). Freights 
increased (Olukoju, 2001). Expatriate firms, freed of German competition, used 
anticompetitive practices to suppress producer prices (Yearwood, 1998, p. 49). By 
September 1918, 17,000 combatants, 2,000 enlisted carriers and 25,000 non-enlisted 
carriers from Nigeria had participated in African campaigns (Matthews, 1987, p. 95). 
Most porters were conscripts recruited through traditional leaders (Matthews, 1987, p. 
96). Nigerians responded with flight into foreign territory, desertion, and violence 
(Matthews, 1987, p. 100-104). This resistance reduced the labour available for public 
works projects (Matthews, 1987, p. 105). Similar pressures were felt in the Gold Coast 
and French West Africa (Killingray, 1978; Page, 1987).   
These effects were also evident in Benin’s rubber industry. The newly restored Oba 
of Benin personally promised the Resident that he would do everything he could, and 
sent thousands of men to the carrier recruitment depot at Sapele (Matthews, 1987, p. 
97). Subordinate Bini chiefs, by contrast, resisted the Oba’s call to recruit carriers. 
Reports from the annual reports of the Forestry and Agriculture Departments during 
the war frequently complain of shortage of staff, as officials spent time attached to the 
West African Frontier Force or were otherwise diverted. Supervision of African staff 
became more difficult,122 training courses were discontinued,123 only “the lightest 
control over the taking of forest produce” was possible,124 and the quantity of rubber 
exported fell further behind the number of permits issued.125 Forest regeneration was 
neglected (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 90).  
The export market had collapsed and the German U-boat campaign had increased the 
dangers involved in trade. Britain introduced a set of restrictions early in the war that 
limited the destinations to which British possessions could send cultivated rubber. 
These restrictions required exporters to obtain licenses for each shipment (Drabble, 
1973, p. 125). These changes also limited shipping capacity in Nigeria (Egboh, 1985, p. 
176). The District Officer pointed out in July 1918 that it was “impossible to import 
rubber into the United Kingdom.” Miller Brothers were unable to ship rubber from 
Sapele. Since there was no market for the Native Administration Rubber, he warned, 
tapping on the communal plantations “should cease temporarily and the trees be 
allowed to rest.”126 He sighed: 
                                                          
120 NAI, Ben Prof 2/5 BP 173/1916 Communal Rubber Plantation Management of, 2 March, 1916: 
Commissioner Benin Province to District Officer. 
121 See, e.g. NAI, Ben Prof 2/3 BP 523 1916: Proceeds from Rubber Sales. 
122 NAUK, CO 657/4: Forest Administration Report for 1919, p. 15 
123 NAUK, CO 657/5: Agricultural Department (Southern Nigeria) Report for 1916, p. 4 
124 NAUK, CO 657/5:  Forest Administration Report for 1916, p. 12 
125 NAUK, CO 657/5:  Forest Administration Report for 1918, p. 8 
126 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division; 4 July, 1918: DO to Resident. 
JAMES FENSKE 
 
29 
 
 
It appears that rubber will not keep in this country, and unless a market can 
be found for the rubber products of the communal rubber plantations and the 
para plantations, it would appear to be a waste of both time and money to 
continue tapping and preparing rubber, as is now being done by the Native 
Administration. 127 
 
In 1921, the Director of Agriculture wrote his above-quoted memorandum 
abandoning rubber. This marked a temporary low point in the global rubber market. 
Rubber prices, inflated between 1922 and 1928 by the Stevenson Restriction Scheme, 
fell to new lows after the onset of the Great Depression.  
From the mid-1930s, the rubber industry in Benin experienced resurgence. Both the 
colonial government and local authorities had become better equipped to offer 
assistance. During the Second World War, the state was able to rapidly mobilize 
production, quickly training produce inspectors and examiners in the preparation of 
wild rubber. Able to employ much of its African staff full time in rubber production, the 
Agricultural and Forestry Departments organized buying organizations and erected 
smoke houses. The capacity of the local Native Authorities had also improved, and these 
assisted with buying by providing lorries, organizing tapping, establishing processing 
stations, and supplying equipment (Fenske, 2012b). During the 1950s, the Western 
Nigeria Development Corporation established a modern estate at Urhonigbe (Lloyd, 
1968, p.6). The government of early post-colonial Nigeria supported rubber through 
tapper training, co-operative processing centres, maintenance training, re-planting 
programs, demonstration plots and research (Anschel, 1969, p. 152). Between 1957 and 
1962, enough higher-yielding seedlings were distributed to plant 8,200 acres, and 213 
local rubber factories were established in the Western Region with government 
encouragement (Helleiner, 1966, p. 123). 
There were, however, limits to the positive role played by the later state. During the 
Second World War, the British struggled to create a system of quality grades suited to 
local conditions, to prevent what they perceived as excessive planting, and to provide 
incentives that were mutually satisfactory to producers and trading firms (Fenske, 
2012b). The late colonial government established a processing factory on the outskirts 
of Benin City in 1954 that, by 1959, had failed financially and was converted into a crepe 
milling factory (Lloyd, 1968, p.6; Obi, 1965). Similarly, because the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Natural Resources in independent Nigeria misunderstood the 
agronomy of rubber, only its re-planting programs and research had proved successful 
(Anschel, 1969, p. 152-153).  
Just as important, then, was the development of the coercive power of the state. 
During the Second World War, the government seized unexploited rubber farms from 
their owners, turning them over to alternative tappers – an intervention that would 
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have been unthinkable before 1921.128  Several measures that Usuanlele (1988, p. 249-
254) claims encouraged rubber planting were only introduced late in this period or 
after 1921.  The installation of Oba Eweka II in 1914 regularized the system of indirect 
rule and reasserted the authority of the centre relative to the “paramount chiefs” of the 
various regions in Benin. The state could not introduce direct taxation before 1916, for 
fear of inciting unrest. Fewer than 600 square miles of forest reserves had been created 
in Benin before 1916 (von Hellerman and Usuanlele, 2009). Under that year’s Forest 
Ordinance, the government acquired greater power to create reserves and, invoking the 
legitimacy of the Oba as “owner of the land”, expanded the area under reserves to cover 
nearly two thirds of the Benin division, or 2,631 square miles, by 1937 (von Hellerman 
and Usuanlele, 2009). The state had gained the capacity to reduce the effective ratio of 
land to labour.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that labour scarcity and the weakness of the colonial state explain the 
difficulties faced by rubber in Benin before 1921.  I have argued that, in wild rubber, 
labour scarcity increased monitoring costs and influenced tapping methods. It raised 
planters’ costs in the private plantation sector, and made proper tapping and 
maintenance of the communal plantations difficult. The colonial state lacked the 
capacity to monitor the exploitation of wild rubber, and the resources to properly 
regulate access to Benin’s stock of wild rubber. Dependent on local chiefs, headmen and 
forest guards, short on staff and equipment, and lacking foresight, the state’s efforts to 
promote plantation rubber were ineffective. The development of plantation rubber in 
Benin would not emerge until these constraints were removed.  
What are the lessons for African development? First, I have re-enforced the 
importance of several unfashionable determinants of technological change. Relative 
factor endowments, in particular the scarcity of labour, held back the adoption of 
plantation rubber. Opportunity costs, especially the relative profitability of work in 
other sectors, had the same effect. This reflects findings of earlier studies of the 
adoption of cash crops in colonial Africa (e.g. Berry, 1975, p. 88). A lack of state capacity 
at both the local and national levels prevented the government from effectively 
establishing property rights, enforcing regulations, or maintaining its investments. In 
addition, I have emphasized that geography is not destiny. In contrast to other examples 
of rapid diffusion of New World crops into areas where they could be grown, the 
transmission of rubber to Benin was delayed. Finally, no condition is permanent. 
Rubber in Benin boomed during the Second World War, only to decline during the 
country’s oil boom. 
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FIGURE 1. THE CENTRAL PROVINCE OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA IN 1914 
Source: The Nigerian border and coordinates for major cities are taken from www.diva-gis.org. The 
boundary of the Central Province is from the 1914 Annual Report for Southern Nigeria. The Niger and 
Benue rivers are taken from www.naturalearthdata.com.  
 
 
